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Abstract. Transhumanism has enormous affect on temporary philosophical thought by 
forcing philosophers to take on many intellectual challenges generated by scientists 
who try to create technological solutions that enable implementation of transhuman-
istic ideas. The question is whether all these ideas will be realized. The purpose of the 
article is to show that the ulitmate goal of transhumanism, to create posthumanistic 
society, is impossible to realize. The first reason is that transhumanism limits human’s 
understanding to the material dimension (from a theological viewpint). While this 
is understandable in the naturalistic paradigm, this approach is insufficient when it 
comes to all complexity of human being and for this reason transhumanism represents 
too narrow a human’s understanding to be able to implement its all assumptions. The 
second reason is that to enable people to become posthumans the latest technologies 
would have to be available to everyone and this seems impossible. If so, such a sit-
uation will divide people into ordinary ones and posthumans and this could lead to 
conflicts that transhumanists want to avoid after all. Finally, the body-mind problem 
is essentially limited to emergentism, which corresponds to the naturalistic paradigm. 
It seems, however, that without the concept of the soul it is impossible to understand 
who a man is, their identity and consciousness and this is crucial for mind uploading.
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Introduction
Transhumanism seems to be much more than only an attempt to improve 
human life. The key concept regarding transhumanism is enhancement. What 
does it really mean to enhance human nature? Is human nature enhanceable? 
And, the final question: will enhancement entail the necessity to redefine 
human nature and to formulate another definition of human? On the an-
swers for these questions depend the implementation of transhumanistic 
idea or it will pertain to Utopian attitudes when it comes to creating the 
best social system being composed of posthumans having extraordinary 
capabilities so advanced that they will be another genus. I do not want to 
present transhumanism as such but basing on some transhumanistic ideas 
I will show arguments indicating whether transhumanism is possible or 
not to realize. 
1. Understanding of a human being in transhumanism
Let us start with possible attitudes to a human being. Basically there 
are three conception of human/humanity: 1) a man is “a product” of the 
natural selection process completely described by the theory of evolution; 
2) a man is contingent being of two elements: body and soul; 3) a man is 
an embodied soul – Plato’s attitude. The third option is rather unpopular 
or just outdated among the vast majority of philosophers. But it does not 
mean that the term like “soul” is outdated too. It depends on a paradigm 
we accept to say whether the usage of the term “soul” is justified or not. It 
does not change the fact that the term is used. If transhumanism is based 
on a certain conception of human, it is the first one. The arguments for 
a such statements can be taken from Max Moore’s A Letter to Mother Nature. 
He writes: “[...] you have in many ways done a poor job with the human 
constitution” (Moore 2009; cf. Asla 2019, 90–91: a poor job is done by the 
original sin and loss of grace). So, what is the human constitution? Generally 
speaking it is narrowed down to the nature: “You made us functional only 
under narrow environmental conditions” (Moore, 2009). A human being 
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is completely describable and explicable by the theory of evolution. Such 
attitude enables transhumanism to hope that the human nature can be 
changed by technology. If this assumption regarding our nature is sine qua 
non condition for transhumanism, let us see what entails thinking about 
humans as the result of the natural selection process only.
The theory of natural selection has two authors: Charles Darwin and 
Alfred Wallace. They both agreed with one another on natural selection 
but disagreed with human evolution (Glickaman 2009, 33). Wallace invoked 
“Power” and “Higher Intelligence” to show the origin of the mankind (Ibid.). 
Their ways split. Darwin was faithful to the naturalistic paradigm but his 
“discussion of human evolution in The Origin of Species is very limited” 
(Ibid., 35). This gap was filled in by Wallace, who believed that the mind 
gave us advantage over other species but finally rejected natural selection 
in 1869 “as the sole element involved in the genesis of humanity” (Ibid., 
35–36). He enumerated a few characteristics testifying about another origin 
than the natural selection, like “hairlessness, the structure of human hand 
and the vocal power of larynx” (Ibid., 36), because the ones “could not 
have contributed to survival and reproduction and therefore could not be 
selected” (Ibid.). But the most problematic issue is the brain.
According to Wallace our brains are so good developed, despite the needs 
people have, that it does not come from natural selection. He compared dif-
ferent peoples living on Earth – unlearned and learned societies (Europeans) 
– and concluded that we all possess brains having abilities far beyond our 
needs letting us to survive: “How, then, was an organ developed so far beyond 
the needs of its possessor? Natural selection could only have endowed the 
savage with a brain a little superior to that of an ape, whereas he actually 
possesses one but very little inferior to that of the average members of our 
learned societies” (Wallace 1869, 392). Darwin denied Wallace’s attitude 
and encapsulated his theory in the naturalistic paradigm. Darwin finally 
set a goal for the theory: to do research without referring to transcendence. 
In this sense the theory of evolution is still Darwinian. Today the one is 
usually called neo-Darwinism, the term used for the first time probably by 
George Romanes in 1895. Roughly speaking it refers to Darwinian theory 
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with no Lamarckism – this change in Darwinism had been done by August 
Weismann – Weismann barrier (Pigliucci 2007, 2744). 
The theory of evolution is now distinct from Darwin’s one if the new 
accomplishments are taken into account, like genetics, ecology, biochemistry, 
cybernetics and biophysics (Kuźnicki & Urbanek 1970, 16). Ernst Mayr 
claims that today evolutionary biology incorporates so many new discoveries 
(“the concepts of mutation, variation, population, inheritance, isolation, 
and species were still rather nebulous in Darwin’s day”) that “is distinctly 
post-Darwinian” (Mayr 1966, 2). However, other authors argue that the 
theory of evolution today is Darwinian because there is no fundamental 
change in comparison to On the Origin of Species in terms of methodology 
and basic concepts (Kuźnicki & Urbanek 1970, 15).
The theory of Darwin is based on “indefinite heredity that allows for 
open-ended evolution” (Day 2012, 626). What does it mean to understanding 
humanity? Perhaps the most crucial problem is how Darwin’s theory applies 
to our spiritual side. John Lucas published a paper about machine-mind 
correlation that has enormous influence on perceiving the mind in context 
of Gödel’s incompletness theorem. He has written that we cannot build 
a machine to be like the mind: “Gödel’s theorem must apply to cybernetical 
machines, because it is of the essence of being a machine, that it should 
be a concrete instantiation of a formal system. It follows that given any 
machine which is consistent and capable of doing simple arithmetic, there is 
a formula which it is incapable of producing as being true – i.e., the formula 
is unprovable-in-the-system-but which we can see to be true. It follows that 
no machine can be a complete or adequate model of the mind, that minds 
are essentially different from machines” (Lucas 1961, 113). The mind can be 
treated as “machine” in the theory of evolution because it does not refere 
to tanscendental features of brain pointing to be the soul-like, at least in 
Darwin’s interpretation. His theory can be incomplete in Gödel’s sense. 
Bological evolution is part of cosmic one (Heller 2012, 274).1 By showing 
1 Heller writes: “laws of physics, cosmological evolution and biological evolution – are 
closely related. [...] Biological evolution is only a fiber of cosmic evolution”.
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that physical theories are incompleted we can prove that Darwin’s theory 
is incomplete too. 
Gödel’s incompletness theorem is applicable to the physial theories 
if they are large enough to enable self-referencing. This case happens 
when a theory “aspire to encompass the whole Universe, covering all the 
phenomena in Nature” (Ben-Ya’acov 2019, 4), because we observe the 
Universe being part of it, not from outside and this entails self-referencing 
and incompletness. Darwin’s theory is all-encompassing regarding life’s 
evolution. We are subject to the process of evolution and “self-referencing 
necessarily involves human consciousness” (Ibid., 6). It means that if the 
theory of evolution is not contradictory, then it is also incomplete and, as 
part of its own methodology, it will not tell us anything more about man. 
However, we see this more. There is a clear analogy with Lucas’s argument 
regarding the machine-mind relationship. We see the truth about man, 
which Darwin’s theory does not see, except that in evolution we do not 
use the term “machine” but “brain”. Some human phenomena that we can 
see – and the theory does not – are: infinite desires. i.e. knowledge, justice 
and love, environmental protection or feeling of transcendence. They are 
unprovable-in-the-system but they are true and do not fit to the concept 
of evolution and struggle for survival (cf. Dawkins 1989, 7). Raymond Tallis 
says that “many aspects of everyday human consciousness elude neural 
reduction” (Tallis 2011, 2). Tallis claims that the mind cannot be reduced 
to “activity in individual brain-bits” (Ibid., 3) at least because then “free 
will would be an illusion” (Ibid.). Basing on Aquinas we can elucidate this 
problem. Mirosław Mróz explains: “Because of his nature man possesses 
a certain balance of the body and due to it no powers of the soul have an 
excessive domination over others. It is different with animals, because they 
are not free but determined and do not act in accordance with virtues only 
according to their habits” (Mróz 2018, 123). The soul-body unity plays a key 
role to understand human phenomena that are not fully encapsulated within 
the theory of evolution. If the soul exists, we cannot change the human 
nature. By manipulating in the body we will not redefine human being 
because what makes us humans lies in connection of these two elements. 
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The soul as non-material being is independent on changes in the body. In 
that case transhumanism could not enhance human nature. 
Transhumanism, despite being part of broadly understood science, put it-
self in the place of philosophy by making several philosophical assumptions:
1) First one is that the humanity is limited to body;
2) According to the following steps: humans → transhumans → post-
humans, transhumanists claim that a new society might be created 
based on the new technologies. What more, posthumans living in 
such society will live in peace and will develop in infinity.
Because these assumptions relate to philosophical considerations, let 
us rethink the arguments given above from philosophical viewpoint. 
2. Cryonics
The first theorem is that humanity is realized within the body’s confines. To 
make transhumanism real, to implement its purposes into life, transhuman-
ists develop such ideas as: grinding/biohacking, anti-aging and anti-death 
movement, technogaianism, singuliatarianism. All these concepts regard to 
the extended life on Earth, perhaps eternal life. While the first problem can 
be treated as a slight interference in our bodies, anti-aging and anti-death 
movement is much more serious. It can be said that if we exclude death, it 
will entail the lack of reproduction of human race. It is called cryonics. As 
we can read on the website of Alcor Life Extention Foundation, “cryonics is 
an effort to save lives by using temperatures so cold that a person beyond 
help by today’s medicine can be preserved for decades or centuries until 
a future medical technology can restore that person to full health” (Alcor 
2019a). How it is possible that after decades or centuries a person will be 
restored to life? Alcor Foundation indicates that the central point to revive 
a human being is to save “a particular structure of matter. Life can be stopped 
and restarted if cell structure and chemistry are preserved sufficiently well” 
(Ibid.). Thomas Donaldson advocated for cryonics saying that it is going 
to be possible to prolong our lives to “immortalilty”. The number given by 
him are as follows: 
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– “complete elimination of aging would imply an average lifespan of 
about 600 years;
– “A rough estimate of the length of time someone may expect to live 
before his body is totally destroyed by accident is about 100,000 
years”;
– “A reduction of the accident to 1/10 its present value, for instance, 
would imply, on these figures, an average longevity of 1,000,000 
years”.
It is said that by technological manipulations in human body we can 
prolong its life actually any amount of time. So, philosophical background of 
thinking about a human being as composition of atoms we can tamper with 
them belongs to – broadly speaking – materialism. Moreover, supporters of 
cryonics argue that our identity after a legal death will be restored as well: “If 
cryonics patients must be legally dead before they are cryopreserved, and if 
once cryopreserved all metabolism has irreversibly (for the present) ceased, 
then are not cryopreserved patients, at least in some limited sense, dead? 
The answer is no” (Wowk 1988, in: Alcor). A study of Natasha Vita-More and 
Daniel Barranco shows possibility of memory preservation after vitrification 
(Vita-More 2015, 458). Admittedly, the study was conducted on warms but it 
is promising for cryonic-supporters that the same could be done to humans.
I think that the above example testifies that a human is seen as materi-
al-based being. Although, Alcor claims that cryonics is in accordance with 
Christianity and other religions. This is because cryonics does not want to 
be perceived as a tool for resurrection from the dead but it is rather like 
stopping the process od passing away and – after decades of centuries – 
a patient will be under the influence of reverse process. A patient did not 
die. The question is: what about the soul? Christians believe in having the 
immortal soul. Death means that the soul separates from the body (STh I, 
q. 89, a. 1). What does it mean to the soul when a patient is cryopreserved? 
On question: “What happens to the souls of people in cryopreservation?”, the 
answer is: “If the premise that patients cryopreserved today are not dead is 
accepted, then the soul of a cryonics patient is in the same condition as the 
soul of a frozen human embryo or the soul of a person who is in a coma or 
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unconscious” (Alcor 2019b). It seems that such statement is in accordance 
with Aquinas doctrine about the soul being present in each part of the body 
(STh, I, q. 76, a. 8).2 Even if not the whole body is vitrified but only the brain, 
it does not matter because the soul of a person exists as the whole being in 
each part, that is in the brain as well.
Perhaps the most important question that can be asked is as follows: 
“Why should Christians, who know their eternal home is Heaven, desire 
to remain alive physically on Earth?” (Alcor 2019b). Alcor’s answer is like 
that: God does not want people to suffer and die, so our efforts to eliminate 
sickness from life and to prolong our existence on Earth are good. According 
to Alcor such attitude has been demonstrated in many places in Bible, both 
in the Old and New Testament (Ibid.). Maybe the best examples are Jesus’ 
miracles. Christ had been taking suffering and illnesses from persons he 
met. The question is why Jesus had been doing it? If we agree with Alcor 
we will concede that the goal was to remove suffering. Taking into account 
that Jesus raised from the dead Lazarus of Bethany, it could be concluded 
that the ultimate purpose of Christ was to eliminate death – in the sense 
of the soul’s separation from body. 
Transhumanism is accord with spirituality. Transhumanistic approach 
to spiritual dimensions of human’s life, Trans-Spirit, “assumes that physical, 
physiological and psychological explanations are preferable to non-phy-
sical, mystical and supernatural ones” (LaTorra 2005, 42). And, if it is an 
approach that enhance the importance of “science and technology, and the 
aim of overcoming hindrances to human well-being” (Ibid.), isomuch “this 
approach precludes the acceptance of many traditional religious beliefs” 
(Ibid.). Spirituality here is focused on removeing suffering that is not treated 
as the value and on “personal transformation and blessed happiness, and 
then share them with others” (Ibid.). In accordance with this approach to 
spirituality Alcor interprets Jesus’ miracles. 
In the light of Biblical Thomism we can interpret Jesus’ miracles. Biblical 
Thomism “seeks to understand and employ the praxis of sacra doctrina, as 
2 The difference between soul and body is connected with the doctrine of hylomorphism. 
More details on hylomorphism you can find here: Manning 2013, 177-181.
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exemplified primarily by Thomas Aquinas, and the pivotal role of Scripture 
in such a speculative engagement with Revelation as a way to overcome 
modern separations” (Roszak and Vijgen 2018, 14; cf. Roszak 2016, 123–125). 
Aquinas’ attitude to the Bible is not separated from his Summa Theologiae. 
“His deeper penetration of certain passages from Scripture leads Aquinas to 
develop his thought” (Roszak and Vijgen 2018, 16). According to Thomas “for 
perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First 
Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with 
that object, in which alone man’s happiness consists” (STh, I–II, q. 3, a. 8.). 
We can conclude that to Thomas union with God is the greatest happiness 
for man and to be unified with God we have to die and go to Heaven. This 
is different approach to happiness than the one did by transhumanists. 
Aquinas interprets also Jesus’ miracles differently.
There are two reasons for miracles: 1) “confirmation of the doctrine 
that a man teaches” and 2) “in order to make known God’s presence in 
a man by the grace of the Holy Ghost” (STh, III, q. 43, a. 1). These reasons 
are met in Christ: by working miracles he was confirming the truth he was 
teaching and the ones were testifying to God’s presence in Jesus (Ibid.). In 
Christ the Kingdom of God came to Earth and in this sense this world has 
become a better place what is in accordance with transhumanism. But if 
the greatest happiness to man is to be unified with God, Jesus’ teaching is 
about another reality (cf. Poytheress 2016, 26–27; Dodd 1935, 38; cf. Paciorek 
2012, 25–26). 
We see that the attitude to human nature of transhumanism is under the 
influence of Darwin’s theory, even when it tries to combine the naturalistic 
viewpoint with religious one including the concept of soul. As it was said, 
the theory of evolution is right wihtin the confines of naturalistic paradigm. 
But it seems to be incompleted if the point is some human phenomena like 
aforementioned.
Even if medicine will be so developed to revive vitrified patients, the 
whole idea of transhumanism is rather Utopia. Behind this statement there 
is transhumanistic assumption that the new technologies will be available 
for all people. We tell about the future society with excluding nobody. The 
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scenario of implementing transhumanism would be realized in two different 
ways. The first one relies on giving to each person on Earth the access to 
technologies allowing to become posthuman. But it is very unlikely because 
in history we do not find examples when one country having technological 
advantage over the other ones would like to share own accomplishments and 
to loose strategical supremacy. If such technology would be given, the second 
option could be realized, that is to give it to chosen societies beginning 
with our country. It entails billions of people being left behind. It is worth 
to add that the chosen people who will skip to posthuministic society will 
be the last generation on Earth, because if ideas of transhumanism are fully 
implemented, like lack of getting old and death, to avoid overpopulation 
the posthumans will not be allowed to have their own children. Roughly 
speaking, the poshumans will be the last “human beings” living forever on 
Earth. 
Looking back at history of philosophy we can see that the situation we 
will have to face with the arrival of technology making transhumanistic idea 
real, has been happened already. In his work Thus Spoke Zarathustra Friedrich 
Nietzsche wrote: “I teach you the overman. Man is something that shall be 
overcome. What have you done to overcome him?” (Nietsche 1954, 124). The 
term Übermensch is not compatible with transhumanistic posthuman for 
Two reasons (Merlo 2019, 54–57): 1) “the closeness of the overman to the 
earth” (Ibid., 54), 2) “death figures massively into Zarathustra’s portrayal 
of the overman” while “goals of the transhumanists is to avoid death” 
(Ibid., 56). However, it is worth to notice that using technology to create 
posthumans and at the same time having people being beyond of these 
technological achivements will divide mankind again. And this is a common 
feature between Übermensch and posthuman: creating a division and this 
might trigger another conflict. 
3. The mind and soul
Before we are going to present a possibility of mind uploading we have to 
see what is the mind and the soul and what kind of interaction is between 
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them. Terminology related to the soul goes back to Homer’s works. The most 
important terms are: ψυχή, θυμός, νοῦς or νόος, φρήν or φρένες, καρδία, κήρ, 
ἦτορ (Furley 1956, 2). These concepts regard basically the “things happening 
to the body” (Ibid.). As time passed the terms took on a new meaning going 
beyond previous connotations, like ψυχή, νοῦς and φρήν. First, their meaning 
was like a description what is going on in a body and then changed into more 
spiritual meaning. How Furley says, “Psyche, thymos and noos are some-
times siad in the Homeric poems to reside in the body [...]” (Ibid., 3). Noos 
changed the meaning to “understanding”, “appreciation” and “thinking” 
(Ibid.). Philosophical turn into non-materialistic view on what we call the 
soul did Plato. The soul is independent on body and should exist without it. 
Later developement of the concept of soul was mainly under the in-
fluecne of Christianity. Church’s Councils were defending immortality 
of soul and its self-existence. One of the best example is the Council of 
Vienne and I accept its descripion of the soul in this article. The Council 
declares: “we define that anyone who presumes henceforth to assert defend 
or hold stubbornly that the rational or intellectual soul is not the form 
of the human body of itself and essentially, is to be considered a heretic” 
(Concilium Viennensis, 361). This approach to the human soul denotes 
that it is a form and entails direct animation, i.e. God creates each soul of 
a particular human being. The soul is intellectual being what is the reference 
to the history of concept. That is why the soul can be seen as ψυχή, νοῦς 
or φρήν but with changed meaning. Unity between the soul and the body 
is called dyadic unity (Bartnik 2009, 407). This unity is composite – unum 
compositum and both elements of a human being are incomplete – anima 
substantia incompleta (Ibid., 408). Presented approach to the concept of 
soul excludes the following solutions of relations between soul and body: 
anthropological monism, extreme duality, Manichaeism, anima communis, 
Cartesian dualsim, emipiricism and sensuality, modern idealistic monism, 
materialistic psychicism (Ibid., 413).
If the point is the mind basically there are two ways of looking at it: 
biological theories and psychological ones: “biological theories of identity 
hold that survival of a person requires intact survival of a brain or a biological 
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organism. Psychological theories of identity hold that survival of a person 
requires the right sort of psychological continuity over time (preservation 
of memories, causally related mental states, and so on)” (Chalmers 2010, 
41–42).
These two theories split into two kinds of argumentation of what the 
mind is. The first one can be totally dependent on brain and then it could 
be interpreted as an upper structure of the brain existing as long as brain. 
But it can be seen as an independent entity in psychological theories. 
Today, because of the naturalistic paradigm, the mind is seen as entity 
being emerged from brain.
4. Mind uploading – is it possible?
The last problem I want to discuss is mind uploading (whole brain emula-
tion/WBE, brain upload, mind transfer). The idea relies on assumption that 
a mind emerges from brain as a new quality being something more than 
simple sum of particles from which the mind comes from. This problem is 
related to a body-mind problem initiated by René Descartes (Descartes, 
II, 8). However, in Descartes’ times the soul was perceived as entity being 
created by God. Today, because of the naturalistic paradigm, the mind is 
seen as entity being emerged from brain. This is physicalism: “mental 
states are states of the body” (Nagel 1974, 446). Such attitude does not 
make the body-mind problem easier to solve (McGinn 1989, 349–350).3 
Still, we do not know what the mind is. We can rather observe how it works. 
Thus, functionalism. The mind being treated as software supervening over 
brain – hardware, is strictly connected with the brain but it is not one itself. 
The change that it can be seen in comparison to Descartes’ contribution 
to the problem relies on a shift being made from the soul – spiritual being 
created by God, to mind – something what we have coming from the brain. 
3 The reason why McGinn says the problem unsolvable is that “[...] we are cut off by our 
very cognitive constitution from acheiving a conception of that natural property of the 
brain (or of consciousness) that accounts for the psychophysical link” (p. 350).
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No matter in what kind of device the mind is uploaded because its con-
tent is the same. It entails so called multiple realizability, the problem – like 
the others – unresolved (Gillet 2003, 592–593, 603). Despite the multiple 
realizability is still uncertain wanting to give the ultimate answer, one might 
to figure it out as a book analogy (Hauskeller 2012, 191–193). Having a copy 
of book, we are going to tend to say that we have that book or rather that 
it is only a copy? Comparig this example with biological and psychological 
theories, a strong division between brain and mind corresponds to an original 
and duplicate in book’s example. If we say that the most important is to 
preserve contents of a book without paying attention to an original thing 
in psychological sense, a physical medium of information does not matter.
It seems that only psychological interpretation enables the mind up-
loading. The assumption is that the mind contains informations but – not 
knowing what the mind is – they might be downloaded from the brain’s 





The first option says that with uploading the neurons are going to be 
destroyed: “Here one freezes a brain, and proceeds to analyze its structure 
layer-by-layer. In each layer one records the distribution of neurons and other 
relevant components, along with the character of their interconnections. 
One then loads all this information into a computer model that includes an 
accurate simulation of neural behavior and dynamics. The result might be 
an emulation of the original brain” (Ibid.). Nondestructive uploading is now 
not available because of lack of technology: “The holy grail here is some sort 
of noninvasive method of brain imaging, analogous to functional magnetic 
resonance imaging but with fine enough grain that neural and synaptic 
dynamics can be recorded” (Ibid.). Development of nanotechnology gives 
hope to insert nanorobots into the brain and to transmit the information 
to a computer: 
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Here one or more nanotechnology devices (perhaps tiny robots) are inserted 
into the brain and attach themselves to a single neuron. Each device learns 
to simulate the behavior of the associated neuron and also learns about its 
connectivity. Once it simulates the neuron’s behavior well enough, it takes the 
place of the original neuron, perhaps leaving receptors and effectors in place 
and offloading the relevant processing to a computer via radio transmitters. It 
then moves to other neurons and repeats the procedure, until eventually every 
neuron has been replaced by an emulation, and perhaps all processing has been 
offloaded to a computer (Ibid.).
Let us assume that some sort of uploading is possible. Then a few important 
questions must be answered. For example, who/what is the uploaded mind? 
Is it me or only mine? If mind uploading can instantiate another me, then 
a question about my identity and consciousness raises. If I am doubled, my 
second me shall have the same rights and so on. Roughly speaking, if we 
agree with a statement that uploaded mind is second me, then my digital 
mind will be a person. Metaphysics is helpful in finding the solution.
First principles allows to investigate metaphysical status of mind up-
loading or – briefly – what exactly is the uploaded mind? The law of identity 
states that for all x: x = x. In our case it means that me = me in this sense 
like I am now. I identify with myself right now and it cannot be another me, 
duplicated. According to the law of excluded middle P v ~ P, it is impossible 
to realize a situation when there are two minds in different states. This law 
says that the mind can exist as a part of brain or in a computer, tertium non 
datur. Finally, the principle of non-contradiction ~ (P ∧ ~ P) teaches that no 
being can be and not to be true in the same time. In other words the law of 
non-contradiction asserts that if the mind coexists with brain and that we 
understand the mind in this way, the one cannot be separated from brain by 
uploading into computer, because then the same being would exist in two 
manners in the same moment. The law of sufficient reason might be also 
added, since it says that there is basically one reason for the mind: brain 
or God. The naturalistic paradigm has chosen the brain because referring 
to God and, consequently, to the soul reminds an argument called God of 
the gaps. The argument is related to the theory of evolution, that is the 
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evolutionists rejct God of the gaps argument stating that it is Bible-based 
view with connection to creationism (Pennock 2007, 310). Methodological 
naturalism does not rule out God but delimits referring to him assuming 
that “there is an account of the world that does not require supernatural 
intervention that can be accessed by scientific means” (Mitchell 2001, 333). 
Doctor Angelicus claims that as long as the soul is connected with 
body must use imagination to cognize (STh, I, q. 89, a. 1). He says that this 
difficulty would be easier to solve from Platonic viewpoint but Aquinas 
believes that it is better for the soul to coexist with body (Ibid.) and here is 
very important text from Summa Theologiae about the nature of cognition: 
“But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it to understand by 
turning to the phantasms, it will seem, since death does not change its 
nature, that it can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms 
are wanting to which it may turn” (STh, I, q. 89, a. 1). Because of its nature 
the soul uses body’s senses to cognize and without the body soul could not 
cognize. In the soul intellectual properties can be found (STh, I, q. 79, a. 1). 
The same ones which are put today in the mind. Aquinas admits that the 
soul being separated from body can still cognize the spiritual substances. 
While being united with the body soul “has a mode of understanding, by 
turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs” (Ibid.). 
In view of the above we can try to answer the question: what is the 
mind? It is a way of cognition rather then “being”. The mind is neither a part 
of the body nor the soul. It is a mode of understanding of a human being 
having two united elements in oneself. The mind is a product of body-soul’s 
connection. This connection instantiates the mind and the one disappears 
when the soul leaves the body.
If we accept above solution, mind uploading will be possible to realize 
but it will not be a person. It should be understood rather as a scan of the 
brain, all informations being copied into a computer, my preserved memory 
being kept in a computer just in case to cure my – among others – future 
diseases etc. The future generations will be able to read in our memories 
and to understand our mindsets in the past times from their perspective. 
But a human being is something more than only the mind’s contents.
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Conclusion
The foregoing discussion shows that transhumanism is partially workable 
because it can preserve our bodies and thereby save us from death by 
stopping the process of dying and reversing it in the future; it can save our 
minds form potential damages by uploading their contents into computers 
and by the same token make incurable diseases being curable; it can also 
help to develop strong artificial intelligence and to raise the level of social 
development. But all of these points to the fact that transhumanism will 
not be fully accomplished. 
The first reason of impossibility of transhumanism’s implementation 
fully is that the theory of evolution seems to be insufficient to encapsulate 
a human being in all aspects and in whole complexity. The second one is 
the assumption that all people will have equal access to the latest tech-
nologies changing them into transhumans and posthumans. It is probable 
impossible (because of political reasons among others) and would divide 
societies into better ones and worse and this could lead to war. Finally, 
mind uploading even if possible to realize, it will not duplicate a person’s 
identity and consciousness. Uploaded mind will not be a person but rather 
their brain scanned neuron by neuron. To sum up, we can answer for the 
title question: transhumanism is heading towards Utopia. It does not rule 
out that can contribute to the development of new technologies and raise 
the level our lives. 
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